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THE COURT IS A FAN OF FANS: JOHNSTON V.
TAMPA SPORTS AUTHORITY CORRECTLY
REFUSED TO EXTEND THE SPECIAL NEEDS
DOCTRINE TO PAT-DOWNS AT
RAYMOND JAMES STADIUM
INTRODUCTION
On a Sunday afternoon in September 2006, during the Chicago
Bears' first home game kickoff, a number of fans stood in long lines
awaiting a mandatory pat-down.' The pat-downs, which cost "about
$10,000 a game," were resumed at Soldier Field after a federal judge
dismissed a suit filed by the Chicago Park District, the owner and op-
erator of Soldier Field. 2 The lawsuit, which "alleged that the pat-
downs were unconstitutional and violated the protection against un-
reasonable searches," was brought in response to security measures
implemented in 2005 by the National Football League (NFL).3
After 9/11, stadiums performed a comprehensive threat assess-
ment. 4 The NFL created a task force charged with advising NFL
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue and all team owners on security mea-
sures regarding the perceived threat of terrorist attacks. 5 The task
force issued a "Best Practices Guide" of recommended security mea-
sures, which included a "careful visual inspection of the patrons
before they come in, as well as a touching or patting of the outer gar-
ments."'6 In 2005, Tagliabue and team owners decided that these pat-
1. See Soldier Field Pat-Downs Delay Some Bears Fans, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 18, 2006, at 3 [here-
inafter Soldier Field Pat-Downs].
2. Chicago Park Dist. v. The Chicago Bears Football Club, Inc., No. 06-C-3957, 2006 WL
2331099 (N.D. I11. Aug. 8, 2006); Andrew Herrmann, Bears Win Ruling, Fans to Get Frisked, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Aug. 26, 2006, at 3; see also Soldier Field Pat-Downs, supra note 1, at 3.
3. Soldier Field Pat-Downs, supra note 1, at 3; see also Mary Adamski, Pro Bowl Attendees to
Undergo Pat-Downs, STARBULLETIN.COM, Feb. 4, 2006, http://starbulletin.com/2006/02/04/newsl
story05.html.
4. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Panel I: Legal Issues in Sports Security, 13 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ErT. L.J. 349, 352-53 (2003) (citing Nick Cafardo, Patriots Plan to Play It Safe,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 19, 2001, at E2; Bob Glauber, NFL Will Beef Up Security, NEWSDAY,
Sept. 18, 2001, at A42; Ronald E. Hurst et al., American Sports As a Target of Terrorism: The
Duty of Care After September 1th (May 13, 2004), http://www.martindale.com/members/Article
-Body.aspx?id=2342) [hereinafter Sports Security Panel].
5. Sports Security Panel, supra note 4, at 352.
6. Id. at 355. The task force also recommended searches of bags or items brought into the
stadiums. Id.
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downs should be mandatory at every stadium.7 While a number of
stadiums have implemented pat-downs without any concern regarding
their constitutionality, this result has not been universal.8
The most recent case, Johnston v. Tampa Sports Authority, was de-
cided by a federal district court in Florida. 9 Specifically, the court
considered whether the pat-downs were justified by the "special
needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment.10 It ultimately held that
these searches were not justified and ordered an injunction prohibit-
ing such searches at Florida's Raymond James Stadium.11 In light of
this decision and the possibility that subsequent lawsuits may chal-
lenge the constitutionality of these pat-downs, scholars should debate
whether the government may conduct suspicionless searches at stadi-
ums. In the current political climate, where every government action
seems to be justified by the threat of a terrorist attack,12 it is crucial
that governmental intrusions upon the constitutional rights of citizens
be thoroughly examined. This examination must be performed to de-
termine whether the government's special need to protect the public
authorizes it to eviscerate citizens' protection from unreasonable
searches as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.13
This Note argues that Johnston was decided correctly. Part II ex-
plains the general requirements of the Fourth Amendment and the
7. See NFL To Institute "Pat-Down" Policy at Its Games, KANsAsCITYCHIEFS.COM, Sept. 8,
2005, http://www.kcchiefs.com/news/2O05/09/08/nfl-to institute-patdown-policy-at-its-games2.
8. See Fans Entering Giants Stadium to Be Subject to "Pat-Downs," GIANTS.COM, Aug. 26,
2005, http://www.giants.com/news/press-releases/story.asp?storyid=7972 ("All fans entering Gi-
ants Stadium will be subject to and should expect to be patted down by security personnel before
going through stadium gates."); Patron Screening and Prohibited Items, GILLETrESTADIUM.COM,
http://www.gillettestadium.com/stadium-information/index.cfm?ac=prohibited-items (last vis-
ited Feb. 13, 2008) ("Everyone who seeks admission into Gillette Stadium... must consent to a
search of their person .... ").
9. 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
10. Id. at 1265.
11. Id. at 1273.
12. The World Org. for Human Rights U.S.A., Torture, Arbitrary Detention, and Other Major
Human Rights Abuses by the United States (Feb. 2006), http://www.2.ohcr.org/english/bodies/hrc/
docs/ngos/wofhr (discussing how the U.S. government used its efforts to combat terrorism to
justify torturing detainees and indefinitely detaining prisoners); Nick Schwellenbach, Keeping
Tabs on the Peaceniks, ALTERNET, Mar. 27, 2006, http:lwww.alternet.org/rights/33949 (discuss-
ing how the U.S. government justifies surveillance of political dissidents as a way to monitor
terrorism).
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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special needs doctrine. 14 Part III discusses Johnston.15 Part IV argues
that Johnston was decided correctly, because the governmental inter-
est does not outweigh the intrusion upon privacy interests that these
pat-downs represent. 16 Part V explains Johnston's impact upon civil
liberties in this country and the security of stadium patrons. 17
II. THE SPECIAL NEEDS EXCEPTION
This Part explains what the Fourth Amendment generally requires
of the government before a citizen may be searched18 It then focuses
on the special needs exception, which permits suspicionless searches
under certain circumstances.' 9 Finally, this Part surveys the ways in
which courts have applied the special needs doctrine to suspicionless
searches performed at large public gatherings, such as rock concerts,
public demonstrations, and sports events. 20
A. Fourth Amendment Requirements and the Special
Needs Exception
The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he Fourth Amendment re-
quires government to respect the right of the people to be secure in
their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures. ' 21 Gen-
erally, for a search to be reasonable, it "must be based on individual-
ized suspicion of wrongdoing. ' 22  Courts have held that the
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing may be satisfied by probable
cause 23 or reasonable suspicion,24 depending on the circumstances.25
While courts have generally prohibited suspicionless searches that vio-
late the Fourth Amendment, they have made exceptions where suspi-
14. See infra notes 18-81 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 82-125 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 126-240 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 241-275 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 30-81 and accompanying text.
21. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. Id. at 313.
23. Probable cause "exist[s] where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant
a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a irime will be
found." Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).
24. Reasonable suspicion is an articulable and particularized belief that criminal activity is
afoot. It must be more than a hunch. Id. at 695.
25. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (requiring evidence of probable
cause before a search is held to be reasonable); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (concluding that
reasonable suspicion sufficiently justifies frisking, but not fully searching, a person).
757
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cionless searches are implemented "to further special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement." 26
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, when "special needs ... are
alleged in justification of a Fourth Amendment intrusion, courts must
undertake a context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing
private and public interests advanced by the parties. ' 27 Thus, courts
weigh the individual's privacy expectations against the government's
interest in the search. 28 The balancing test applied in special needs
cases is usually "broken down into the tripartate considerations of (1)
the degree and nature of intrusion entailed by the search, (2) the pub-
lic necessity for the search measured in terms of potential harm to the
public, and (3) the efficacy of the search. '29
B. Applying the Special Needs Doctrine to Large Public Gatherings
The special needs exception has been used to justify limited suspi-
cionless searches based on the need to secure the safety of the public
gathered 30 at places such as airports and courthouses. 31 However, as
the Supreme Court of Washington categorically stated, this "special
exemption from constitutional protections should [not] be made for
26. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646. 653 (1995) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). The Supreme Court has found that the special needs doctrine justifies government conduct
in certain circumstances. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)
(drug testing of railroad personnel involved in train accidents); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (random drug testing of federal customs officers who carry
guns); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (automobile checkpoints for illegal
immigrants and intoxicated drivers); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 664 (random drug test-
ing of students in athletics and other extracurricular activities); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (same). Additionally, various cir-
cuit courts have held that the special needs doctrine justifies suspicionless searches at airports
and courthouses. See United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1974) (airport); United
States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973) (airport); United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231 (5th
Cir. 1972) (courthouse); Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972) (courthouse).
27. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314 (internal quotation marks omitted).
28. Id.; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47., 515 U.S. at 646: Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665; Skinner,
489 U.S. at 619.
29. Ringe v. Romero, 624 F. Supp. 417, 420 (W.D. La. 1985); accord Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F.
Supp. 1134, 1145 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Jensen v. City of Pontiac. 317 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982).
30. While this Note focuses on large public gatherings, Ringe is also applicable to this discus-
sion. 624 F. Supp. 417 (holding that suspicionless searches at a local bar could not be justified by
the special needs exception). Ringe applied the special needs doctrine to a bar, which is a type of
venue similar in purpose to a sports stadium-providing entertainment-even though the num-
ber of people gathering at a local bar is drastically lower than the number of people gathering at
a professional sports stadium.
31. See Edwards, 498 F.2d 496; United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973);
Moreno, 475 F.2d 44; Bell, 457 F.2d 1231: Downing, 454 F.2d at 1233.
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rock concerts or other gatherings in public arenas. '32 As illustrated in
the cases below, 33 courts have generally rejected the special needs
doctrine as justifying suspicionless searches at places of large public
gatherings other than airports or courthouses. 34
1. Applying the Special Needs Doctrine to Rock Concerts
Applying the special needs doctrine to suspicionless searches at
rock concerts, courts have generally held that the intrusiveness of
physically searching each attendee's person outweighed the minimal
governmental need for the searches; thus, the searches fell outside of
the special needs exception. 35 Courts first considered the nature of
the governmental interest at stake by examining the seach's objective
"in light of the nature of the threat involved and the likelihood that
the threat will materialize. ' 36 In this line of cases, the courts found
that the nature of the threat involved was potential injury posed by
objects that may be thrown at other spectators or the entertainers
from the stands. 37 Courts held that the nature of the threat was not
great, because "dangers posed by the potential use of bottles and cans
as projectiles pales in comparison to the dangers posed by a bomb or a
gun used to facilitate a skyjacking or terrorize a courtroom. ' 38 As to
the likelihood that the threat will materialize, courts looked at
whether there was a past history of injury caused by thrown objects. 39
In two of the cases, there was no evidence that the threat had ever
materialized, 40 but, in one case, the evidence showed that the threat
32. Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 658 P.2d 653, 656 (Wash. 1983).
33. In many of these cases, courts have also considered whether other exceptions could justify
suspicionless searches at large public gatherings, including the consent exception. See Gaioni v.
Folmar, 460 F. Supp. 10, 14 (M.D. Ala. 1978): Stroeber v. Comm'n Veteran's Auditorium, 453 F.
Supp. 926, 932 (S.D. Iowa 1977); Wheaton, 435 F. Supp. at 1144; Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp.
1357, 1365 (S.D. Tex. 1976); State v. Seglen, 700 N.w.2d 702, 708-09 (N.D. 2005). The other
exception considered by the courts was the "stop-and-frisk" exception, set forth in Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968). See Stroeber, 453 F. Supp. at 932; Wheaton, 435 F. Supp. at 1144.
34. See, e.g., Stroeber, 453 F. Supp. at 932 (holding that, based on precedent of the special
needs exception in the context of searches at public auditoriums, the exception is inapplicable
and cannot justify suspicionless searches at rock concerts); but see Jensen, 317 N.W.2d at 624
(holding that suspicionless searches at a professional football game were justified by the special
needs exception; however, the case involved a visual search only and not a physical pat-down).
35. See Gaioni, 460 F. Supp. at 15; Collier, 414 F. Supp. at 1367; Jacobsen, 658 P.2d at 656; see
also Stroeber, 453 F. Supp. at 932; Wheaton, 435 F. Supp. at 1136.
36. Collier, 414 F. Supp. at 1362; accord Gaioni, 460 F. Supp. at 13-14; Jacobsen, 658 P.2d at
656.
37. See Gaioni, 460 F. Supp. at 13-14: Collier, 414 F. Supp. at 1362; Jacobsen, 658 P.2d at 656.
38. Collier, 414 F. Supp. at 1362; accord Gaioni, 460 F. Supp. at 14; Jacobsen, 658 P.2d at 656.
39. See Gaioni, 460 F. Supp. at 14; Collier, 414 F. Supp. at 1362; Jacobsen, 658 P.2d at 656.
40. See Gaioni, 460 F. Supp. at 13-14 ("Indeed, violence inside the Civic Center has never
been a problem at rock concerts."); Collier, 414 F. Supp. at 1362 ("In the present case the de-
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had materialized before the searches were implemented. 41 Where the
nature of the threat was not severe, and where there was no evidence
that the threat was likely to materialize based on past history, the
courts found that the governmental interest was minimal.42 Yet, even
where "the record clearly established a serious problem and a legiti-
mate basis for the City's concerns," the court held that the govern-
mental interest was minimal, because the nature of the threat was not
severe.
43
Courts also considered the degree and nature of the intrusion upon
patrons' privacy rights. 44 They found that the pat-downs employed at
the concerts have a "high degree of intrusion,' 45 specifically when
compared with suspicionless searches with magnetometers, 46 which
have been permitted at courthouses and airports. 47 Courts further ex-
amined whether the searches were conducted indiscriminately, that is,
whether the people performing the searches had any discretion as to
when or how the search was performed. 4  Finally, the courts focused
on the fact that, unlike searches at airports and courthouses, which
have been justified by the special needs exception, searches at con-
certs have been relatively ineffective. 49 The courts specifically noted
that the searches were unlikely to achieve the purpose of completely
eliminating the objects that may be thrown. 50
fendants produced absolutely no evidence of any history of disturbances or injuries caused by
thrown cans or bottles before ... implementation of the search policy.").
41. See Jacobsen, 658 P.2d at 654 ("There have been frequent violations of the law at various
rock concerts held at the Seattle Center Coliseum, including the throwing of hard and dangerous
objects by some of those attending the concerts.").
42. See Gaioni, 460 F. Supp. at 14; Collier, 414 F. Supp. at 1362-63.
43. Jacobsen, 658 P.2d at 656 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. See id.; see also Gaioni, 460 F. Supp. at 14; Collier, 414 F. Supp. at 1364.
45. Jacobsen, 658 P.2d at 656.
46. A magnetometer is "a device that is activated by ferrous metal." United States v. Al-
barado, 495 F.2d 799, 802-03 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974). There are two basic types of magnetometers, a
walk-through magnetometer and a hand-held magnetometer, which is usually used after the
walk-through magnetometer is activated. Id.
47. Jacobsen, 658 P.2d at 656; see also Gaioni, 460 F. Supp. at 14 ("The evidence reflects that
the Civic Center searches were very intrusive. ... ). Security personnel asked attendees to
open their coats, patted down any bulges, and examined the insides of pockets. Gaioni, 460 F.
Supp. at 12.
48. See Collier, 414 F. Supp. at 1364.
49. Gaioni, 460 F. Supp. at 14.
50. See id. ("Although [in the course of the searches] defendants did seize some contraband,
drug and alcohol use at the .. concert was not eliminated."); Collier, 414 F. Supp. at 1363 ("[1]t
is at least questionable whether random searches of the many thousands of patrons could
achieve the valid purpose of excluding the objectionable items .... ").
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2. Applying the Special Needs Doctrine to Public Demonstrations
Courts have also considered the application of the special needs
doctrine to suspicionless searches at public demonstrations. 51 Bour-
geois v. Peters illustrates how one court handled the argument that the
government has a special need to conduct suspicionless searches at
large public gatherings because of a perceived terrorist threat. 52 The
court examined the governmental interest and found that, while the
nature of the threat was "omnipresent," there still had to be a likeli-
hood that the threat would materialize. 53 The city argued that an ele-
vated terrorist threat level at the time of the protest sufficiently
proved that the threat was likely to materialize and justified the
searches. 54 The court rejected this argument, holding instead that a
general threat of a terrorist attack cannot be used to restrict civil liber-
ties, because "the War on Terror is unlikely ever to be truly over."'55
Absent evidence indicating that there was a specific likelihood of a
terrorist attack on the protest, the court held that the governmental
interest lacked the immediacy that would justify a suspicionless
search.56 The court also discussed the intrusion upon the privacy
rights of the protestors. 57 In determining whether the governmental
interest at stake outweighed the protestors' privacy interest, it specifi-
cally considered whether the protestors had a diminished expectation
of privacy.58 Precedent, as the court noted, indicated that persons are
protected by the Fourth Amendment even in public. 59 Therefore, the
court found that protestors "retained a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in their person[s]" when they attended the public protest. 60 Ulti-
51. See Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2004) (discussing the application of the
special needs exception to searches at a protest against federal funding for the School of the
Americas); Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03-Civ.-9162, 2004 WL 1593870, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
July 16, 2004) (discussing the application of the special needs exception to searches at numerous
New York City political demonstrations); see also Wilkinson v. Forst, 832 F.2d 1330 (2d Cir.
1987) (discussing the application of the special needs exception to mass pat-down searches con-
ducted at Ku Klux Klan rallies and holding that such searches violated the Fourth Amendment).
52. 387 F.3d at 1311 ("[T]he City contends that post September 11, 2001, this Court can deter-
mine that the preventive measure of a magnetometer at large gatherings is constitutional as a
matter of law." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
53. Id. (holding that there must be "reason to believe that international terrorists would target
or infiltrate this protest" to justify searches on the grounds of special need).
54. Id. at 1312.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1311.
57. Id. at 1315-16.
58. Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1315-16.
59. Id. at 1315. "In their persons ... individuals are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment
protection when they step from their homes onto the public sidewalks." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1979)).
60. Id. at 1316.
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mately, the court held that the suspicionless magnetometer searches
could not be justified under the special needs exception, because the
governmental interest did not outweigh the protestors' legitimate
Fourth Amendment privacy interests.6
1
Similarly, in Stauber v. City of New York, mere suspicionless
searches of demonstrators' bags at a public demonstration could not
be justified by vague threats of a terrorist attack.62 The court focused
on the lack of specific information concerning a terrorist attack at the
New York City demonstrations and on the fact that there was no
showing that these searches would be effective in eliminating or re-
ducing the terrorist threat.63
3. Applying the Special Needs Doctrine to Sports Events
Beyond applying the special needs doctrine to suspicionless
searches at rock concerts and public demonstrations, courts have also
considered the doctrine's application to searches at sports events. 64 In
at least one case challenging suspicionless searches at stadiums, the
government has argued that "the security needs at large arenas and
sporting events are similar to airports and courthouses, especially in
recent years"; thus, the special needs exception should be extended to
suspicionless searches at sports stadiums. 65 In State v. Seglen, how-
ever, the court refused to accept this argument.66 Because "there was
no history of injury or violence" at this particular stadium, the court
found that there was no immediacy to the governmental interest of
protecting patrons from terrorist attacks at that stadium. 67 The court
noted another circuit's recent declaration that, while the general
threat of a terrorist attack in the United States may be great, such a
general threat cannot justify suspicionless searches at all places of
large public gatherings. 68 Following suit, the Seglen court held that a
61. Id.
62. No. 03-Civ.-9162, 2004 WL 1593870, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2004) ("Accordingly, plain-
tiffs' request for injunctive relief with respect to the bag searches is granted.").
63. Id. ("Given the record before the Court, the defendants have not shown that the invasion
of personal privacy entailed by the bag search policy is justified by general invocation of terrorist
threats, without showing how searches will reduce the threat.").
64. See Jensen v. City of Pontiac, 317 N.w.2d 619, 619 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Seglen,
700 N.W.2d 702, 702 (N.D. 2005).
65. Seglen, 700 N.W.2d at 707.
66. Id. at 708. The court noted that "[o]ther courts have rejected this argument when asked to
extend the warrant exception to rock concerts." Id. at 707 (citing Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp.
1357 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 658 P.2d 653 (Wash. 1983)).
67. Id. at 708.
68. Id. The court declared that, "[w]hile the threat of terrorism is omnipresent. we cannot use
it as the basis for restricting the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protections in any large
gathering of people .... September 11, 2001, already a day of immeasurable tragedy, cannot be
[Vol. 57:755
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general threat of a terrorist attack, without any immediacy of such an
attack on the specific stadium, could not justify suspicionless searches
at that stadium.69 Finally, it considered the nature of the intrusion and
held that, "[b]ecause a pat-down is very intrusive, ' 70 it cannot be con-
sidered a mere extension of a visual observation, 71 which has been
held to be minimally invasive. 72
In another recent case, a district court clarified that a substantial
showing of a real threat of danger at a sports event-not just a general
threat or a threat based on an anonymous tip-is required before sus-
picionless searches of all spectators may be justified.73 However, the
searches in this case were far more intrusive than traditional pat-
downs. 74
In contrast, a Michigan appellate court held that the special needs
exception justified suspicionless visual bag searches at a professional
football game. 75 Contrary to the trend developed in the case law dis-
cussed above, Jensen extended the special needs exception to searches
at a place of large public gathering other than an airport or a court-
house.76 The court first considered the nature of the governmental
interest, which was the protection of patrons at the game from injuries
caused by thrown objects.77 There, the nature of the threat was seri-
ous, because "[t]he seating arrangement at football games creates a
unique problem in that objects thrown from seats above gain poten-
the day liberty perished in this country." Id. (quoting Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303,
1311-12 (11th Cir. 2004)).
69. Id.
70. Seglen, Id. at 709 (citing Jensen v. City of Pontiac, 317 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982); State v. Zearley, 444 N.W.2d 353, 356 (N.D. 1989)).
71. Seglen, 700 N.W.2d. The state argued that a suspicionless pat-down is no more intrusive
than a suspicionless visual observation search, which was justified by the special needs exception
in Jensen, because a pat-down search is "but an extension of the visual observations, justified by
patrons' ability to conceal items in oversized clothing . I..." Id.
72. Id. (finding that the searches in Jensen were minimally invasive, because they involved
only visual observations).
73. Williams v. Brown, 269 F. Supp. 2d 987. 991 (N.D. I11. 2003). The lawsuit, brought by
spectators at a basketball tournament, alleged that searches of all spectators' bodies, pockets,
coats, and bags, based on an anonymous tip concerning a threat of danger at the basketball
game, violated the Fourth Amendment. Id.
74. The police "thoroughly searched the plaintiffs' bodies, pockets, coats, and bags, a process
that took more than an hour." Id. at 990. The searches extended to children, as well as "the
bodies of basketball players clad only in shorts and tank tops ...." Id. at 991.
75. Jensen, 317 N.W.2d at 624.
76. One commentator has stated that Jensen is a minimal departure from the trend of not
extending the special needs exception to places of large public gatherings other than courthouses
and airports, because it is merely a "cautious approval of the most minimal type of search (a
visual-only bag inspection)." Cathryn L. Claussen, The Constitutionality of Mass Searches of
Sports Spectators, 16 J. LEGAL AsPECTS SPORT 153, 158 (2006).
77. Jensen, 317 N.W.2d at 623-24.
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tially fatal velocity and nearly always strike an unsuspecting patron in
the head or shoulder region."' 78 The court also found that there was
immediacy to the governmental interest, because the evidence showed
that there had been "widespread injuries to patrons which occurred as
a result of thrown objects" at football games at the specific stadium
where the searches had been implemented. 79 Further, the court deter-
mined that the searches were effective, because evidence showed that
"injuries caused by thrown objects [were] substantially reduced since
the implementation of the policy."'80 Finally, because the searches in-
cluded only visual observations and not pat-downs, which the court
stated were "more intrusive than a limited visual search," it concluded
that the nature and degree of intrusion was minimal. 81
III. JOHNSTON V. TAMPA SPORTS AUTHORITY]. REJECTION OF THE
SPECIAL NEEDS JUSTIFICATION FOR SUSPICIONLESS PAT-
DOWNS AT RAYMOND JAMES STADIUM
First, this Part sets out Johnston's facts, issues, and procedural his-
tory.82 Then, it describes the court's special needs analysis and ex-
plores the court's reasoning,83 detailing the court's examination of the
governmental interest, the plaintiff's privacy interest, and the effec-
tiveness of the pat-downs.84 Finally, it examines how the court bal-
anced the competing interests in reaching its final decision.8 5
A. Factual and Procedural History
Beginning in August 2005, the NFL required physical searches of all
attendees before entering stadiums.8 6 The pat-downs were imple-
mented in response to the risk of a terrorist attack implementing an
"improvised explosive device."'8 7 Then, in September 2005, the Tampa
Sports Authority (TSA) authorized pat-down searches of fans enter-
ing Florida's Raymond James Stadium ("Stadium") to attend football
78. Id. at 623.
79. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Id. at 624.
81. Id. The search "procedure requires the guards to inspect only visually the patrons and
their property. Guards are specifically instructed not to place their hands in patrons' contain-
ers." Id.
82. See infra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 98-125 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 98-121 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 122-125 and accompanying text.
86. Johnston v. Tampa Sports Authority, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
87. Id. The court provided examples of improvised explosive devices, including "'suicide
bomber' belts and vests." Id. at 1260 n.4.
[Vol. 57:755
2008] JOHNSTON V. TAMPA SPORTS AUTHORITY 765
games.88 The TSA hired screeners to conduct the pat-downs, which
were generally "performed above the patron's waist." 89 The pat-down
searches consisted of a visual inspection of a patron's "wrists and arms
for switches, wires, or push-button devices" and a physical inspection
by "touching, patting, or lightly rubbing the person's torso, around his
waist, along the belt line" and "back along the spine from the belt line
to the collar line." 9
0
In Johnston, the court addressed whether it should affirm a prelimi-
nary injunction prohibiting mandatory pat-downs performed by the
TSA at the Stadium, because of the alleged unconstitutionality of the
pat-downs. 91 The plaintiff, a Tampa Bay Buccaneers 92 season ticket
holder, filed a lawsuit against the TSA,93 seeking declaratory and in-
junctive relief on the basis that the pat-downs violated his state consti-
tutional rights.94 The trial court granted an injunction prohibiting the
pat-downs. 95 In November 2005, the plaintiff amended his complaint
to include a claim that the "searches violate the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. '96 Following the amended com-
plaint, the defendants successfully sought removal of the case to fed-
eral district court based on federal question jurisdiction. 97
B. The Court's Special Needs Analysis
The majority opinion addressed the defendants' argument that the
preliminary injunction should be reversed, because the plaintiff had
failed to prove that he was likely to prevail on the merits of his
claims.98 The defendants argued that the balancing of interests in this
case weighed against the issuance of an injunction, because the TSA
demonstrated a special need and "the Plaintiff [had] no reasonable
88. Id. at 1260.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1261.
92. The Tampa Bay Buccaneers, an NFL franchise, "plays its home football games at the
Stadium pursuant to the Buccaneer's Stadium Agreement with the TSA." Johnston, 442 F.
Supp. 2d at 1260.
93. Id. at 1260-61. "The TSA is a public entity created by the Florida legislature ... [which]
operates the publicly-owned Stadium." Id. at 1260.
94. Id. at 1261.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. Federal question jurisdiction permits federal courts to have original jurisdiction of all
civil cases "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (2000).
98. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1262.
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expectation of privacy at the NFL games." 99 First, the court consid-
ered the governmental interest of protecting patrons from the risk of a
potential terrorist attack. 00 To justify the special needs exception,
precedent dictates that the risk of a terrorist attack on the stadium
must not only be substantial but must also be real. 10 1 The court found
that the special need to prevent terrorist attacks is substantial, because
no one could dispute the "magnitude of the threat of terrorism to this
country" or "the potential harm that would result from a terrorist at-
tack at the Stadium."' 02
However, as to the determination of whether the risk of a terrorist
attack on an NFL stadium was real, the court noted that the evidence
consisted of only the following four sources: a relatively dated news
report of a possible terrorist attack on NFL stadiums, which was dis-
credited by the FBI;103 a report by the U.S. Department of State
describing a disruption of terrorist plans to bomb a soccer stadium in
Spain; t0 4 a bulletin identifying tourist facilities as attractive terrorist
99. Id. The opinion also addressed two other arguments presented by the defendants. The
first was that "the pat-downs were not performed by state actors because the TSA was not acting
in governmental capacity and was not performing a governmental function." Id. (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). The defendants argued that the Fourth Amendment could not be violated,
because it applies only where the search is performed by a government agent. Id. The court
rejected this first argument, holding that the pat-down searches constituted state action, because
the TSA, acting as a public entity fulfilling its public purpose (maintaining the Stadium), imple-
mented the pat-down policy, hired and supervised the security personnel, and paid for the
searches with-public funds. Id. at 1263. This author would like to point out that, based on the
above-described analysis, the pat-down searches at Soldier Field, performed by the Chicago Park
District, would also constitute state action, because the Chicago Park District is a public entity (a
sister agency of the City of Chicago government agencies). See City of Chicago Website, Local
Government, Other Governmental Units & Sister Agencies, http://www.CityofChicago.org (last
visited Feb. 13, 2008). Defendants' second argument was that the pat-downs were constitutional,
because "[p]laintiff consented to the search by repeatedly attending NFL games" with the
knowledge that he would be subjected to a search or denied entry. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at
1271. The court also rejected this argument, holding that this implied consent was not free from
constraint and voluntarily given, because the Plaintiff stood to lose the value of his tickets, park-
ing pass, seat deposit, and opportunity to attend the games if he failed to consent to the search.
Id. at 1272.
100. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1265.
101. Id. at 1266. While the threat must be real and not merely hypothetical, the court noted
that the TSA was not required to "establish that an attack on an NFL stadium is certain or
imminent." Id. at 1269 n.18.
102. Id. at 1266.
103. Id. at 1267. The report was "a CBS news report from July 2002 that persons associated
with terrorist groups had downloaded images from the internet of NFL stadiums in Indianapolis
and St. Louis." Id. "However, according to the report, the FBI investigated that incident and
determined that it presented no threat, not even a perceived or implied threat." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
104. Id.
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targets; 0 5 and testimony of a "general concern that public events at
which large crowds gather could be potential targets of terrorism."'
10 6
Based on such evidence, the court found that, "[a]lthough the record
demonstrates a generalized threat of terrorism to large gatherings, the
[defendants have] not met [their] burden of establishing a substantial
and real risk of a terrorist attack on a NFL stadium. ' 10 7 Thus, the
special needs exception could not be justified solely on the govern-
mental interest in the case, because the defendants failed to prove that
the risk of a terrorist attack on an NFL stadium was real. 10 8
Next, the court explored whether the plaintiff had a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy when he attended a football game and what de-
gree of intrusion the pat-down search imposed. 0 9 Based on U.S.
Supreme Court10 and Eleventh Circuit 1 1 precedent, 1 2 the court held
that a person's expectation of privacy in her body is not diminished
when she attends a public gathering, such as a football game. 113 Fur-
ther, the degree of intrusion imposed by the pat-downs in Johnston
was great, because pat-down searches "have been regarded as far
more intrusive than container searches, sniff searches performed by
canines, and magnetometer searches applied to the public at large,"
all of which have been held constitutional.' "4 Thus, the court held that
105. Id. at 1267-68. The bulletin was issued in October of 2005 by the Department of Home-
land Security (DHS). Id. However, the court noted that the "DHS expressly stated that there
[was] currently no credible or specific intelligence regarding the possibility of such an attack in
the United States" on a sports stadium, nor did the bulletin suggest that patrons of these identi-
fied tourist facilities be subjected to suspicionless pat-downs. Id. at 1268 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
106. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1268. One expert from the commercial explosives industry
testified that NFL games "could be a very attractive target for terrorists, as could any large
venue or venue where people gather in great numbers." Id. (emphasis omitted).
107. Id. at 1266 (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. Id. at 1269.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (holding that "wherever an individual may
harbor a reasonable expectation of privacy ... he is entitled to be free from unreasonable gov-
ernmental intrusion" (internal quotation marks omitted))).
111. The Eleventh Circuit has jurisdiction over federal cases originating in Alabama, Florida,
and Georgia. See Official Website of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, About the Court, http://www.call.uscourts.gov/about/index.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
112. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that "[iun their persons
and property.., individuals are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step
from their homes onto the public sidewalks" (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
113. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.
114. Id. (citing Wilkinson v. Forst, 832 F.2d 1330, 1337-38 (2d Cir. 1987) (upholding mass-
suspicionless magnetometer searches as reasonable and less intrusive than pat-downs)); Jensen v.
City of Pontiac, 317 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing that "[a] physical pat-
down is more intrusive than a limited visual search"); U.S. v. Cintron-Segarra, No. 92-306, 1993
WL 150307, at *3 (D.P.R. Apr. 5, 1993) (recognizing that hand-held magnetometer searches are
"a much less intrusive alternative than a pat-down or frisk").
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the special needs exception could not be justified by a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy in this case. 115
Next, the court examined the effectiveness of the pat-downs and
concluded that the defendants failed to establish that the governmen-
tal interest at stake would be jeopardized if the searches were prohib-
ited. 116 Although there was expert testimony "that the pat-down
searches are the most effective means of detecting [improvised explo-
sive devices]," the court found that the circumstances surrounding the
implementation of these searches, including the timing of the imple-
mentation, 17 the motivation for the implementation," 8 and the appli-
cation of the implementation, 19 suggested that the pat-downs were
not "an essential aspect of terrorism protection.' 1 20 All of these fac-
tors suggested that the overriding concern in implementing the pat-
downs was fulfillment of a contract between the TSA, the NFL, and
the Tampa Bay Buccaneers-not protection against terrorist
attacks. 21
Finally, the court balanced the governmental interest against the
privacy interest of individuals to determine whether a special needs
exception could be applied to the suspicionless pat-downs. 22 The
government had a compelling interest in preventing terrorist attacks,
but the court noted that the public also had "a compelling interest in
preserving the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable gov-
ernmental intrusion."'1 23 The court found that the privacy interest im-
plicated by the searches was great, the threat of a terrorist attack on a
stadium-while substantial-was not real, and the prevention of a ter-
rorist attack would not be jeopardized by prohibiting these searches.
Thus, the special needs exception did not apply to these searches, 124
and the plaintiff was likely to succeed on his claims that the searches
were unconstitutional. Therefore, the court affirmed the preliminary
injunction prohibiting these searches. 125
115. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
116. Id. at 1270.
117. Id. at 1270-71. "TSA did not institute pat-down searches until two years after it received
the only specific threat to the Stadium .... " Id. at 1271.
118. Id. at 1271 ("The evidence suggests that the TSA decided to implement the policy in
large part, if not exclusively, because of its perceived contractual obligation to do so.").
119. Id. ("[The TSA] chose to apply the policy only to Buccaneers games.").
120. Id.
121. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
122. Id. at 1272.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1272-73.
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE BALANCING TEST USED IN SPECIAL
NEEDS CASES REVEALS THAT JOHNSTON WAS
CORRECTLY DECIDED
This Part explores the Johnston opinion. First, it analyzes whether
the governmental interest of protecting stadium patrons from a terror-
ist attack is compelling and immediate. 126 It considers the possible
consequences of such an attack to determine its gravity and the likeli-
hood of such an attack occurring to determine its immediacy. Second,
this Part examines whether the NFL's mandatory pat-downs violate
reasonable expectations of privacy. 127 It considers whether patrons
entering football stadiums have diminished expectations of privacy be-
cause they are in public. Third, this Part discusses the degree and na-
ture of the intrusion upon the privacy interest.128 It examines
precedent to determine whether pat-downs have been viewed as intru-
sive, and it considers the emotional effects of pat-downs. Fourth, this
Part analyzes the efficacy of the pat-downs. 2 9 It considers factors
such as duration of the pat-downs, the competence of those perform-
ing the pat-downs, the possible negative consequences of the pat-
down policy, and alternative motivations by the NFL in implementing
the pat-downs. Finally, this Part balances the governmental interest
with the privacy interest and concludes that the former does not out-
weigh the latter. 30
A. Examination of the Governmental Interest
In examining the governmental interest, courts must evaluate "the
nature of the threat to public safety involved and the likelihood that
such a threat will materialize. ' 131 Thus, the Johnston court followed
precedent when it analyzed the gravity of the threat of a terrorist at-
tack on an NFL stadium and the likelihood that such an attack would
occur.132 As one commentator stated, in determining whether the
governmental interest is compelling in light of the nature of the threat,
courts look at whether the threat involves possible "death or serious
injury to a substantial number of persons.1 33 In examining the grav-
126. See infra notes 131-158 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 159-167 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 168-205 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 206-231 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 232-240 and accompanying text.
131. Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1145 (M.D.N.C. 1977); accord Chandler v. Miller,
520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997); Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357, 1362 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
132. Johnston v. Tampa Sports Authority, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
133. Benjamin T. Clark, Why the Airport and Courthouse Exceptions to the Search Warrant
Requirement Should be Extended to Sporting Events, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 707, 721 (2006).
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ity of the threat, the Johnston court could have concluded that the
nature of the threat of a terrorist attack on a stadium was not great,
and, therefore, the governmental interest was not compelling. In-
stead, the Johnston court found that "[o]ne cannot seriously dispute
the magnitude of the threat of terrorism to this country" and "the
potential harm that would result from a terrorist attack at the Sta-
dium. 1 1 34 The gravity of the threat posed by a terrorist attack on a
stadium is much more severe than the gravity of the threat posed by
objects thrown from stands, a threat implicated in a number of cases
involving searches at large public gatherings. 135
As to the number of persons at risk, stadiums, rock concerts, and
public rallies present similar difficulties, because "tens of thousands of
fans ... pack sports stadiums, 1 36 and, similarly, thousands of patrons
attend rock concerts 137 and public demonstrations. 38 However, the
threat of a terrorist attack on a stadium presents a number of
problems exacerbating the gravity of the threat that are not implicated
by the threat of thrown objects. A terrorist attack on a stadium would
likely cause a high number of casualties both directly and collaterally.
Those unharmed would "frantically [flee] the stadium," and those se-
riously injured would possibly fail to receive proper medical treat-
ment, because "local hospitals would likely struggle to treat tens of
thousands of suddenly wounded persons. '139 Further, as one com-
mentator observed, the gravity of a terrorist attack on a stadium is
great even if the casualty toll would be relatively small, because such
an attack "could bring the nation to its psychic knees. ' 140 Thus, be-
134. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1266.
135. See Gaioni v. Folmar, 460 F. Supp. 10, 14 (M.D. Ala. 1978) (holding that dangers posed
by thrown objects at rock concerts are slight in comparison to dangers posed by a gun or bomb
used as a means of carrying out a terrorist attack); Collier, 414 F. Supp. at 1362; Jacobsen v. City
of Seattle, 658 P.2d 653, 656 (Wash. 1983); but see Jensen v. City of Pontiac, 317 N.W.2d 619, 623
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that dangers posed by thrown objects at sports events are grave,
because they can cause serious injury or even death).
136. Clark, supra note 133, at 735.
137. See Brooke Friley, Rolling Stones Rock the Race Track, THE LOUISVILLE CARDINAL, Oct.
3, 2006 (reporting that 40,000 individuals attended the Rolling Stones concert at Kentucky's
Churchill Downs).
138. See Cities Jammed in Worldwide Protest of War in Iraq, Feb. 16, 2003, http://www.cnn.
com/2003/US/02/15/sprj.irq.protests.main/index.html (reporting that organizers of a political
public protest against the Iraq war estimated that 375,000 individuals attended the protest).
139. Michael A. McCann, Social Psychology, Calamities, and Sports Law, 42 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 585, 603 (2006) (citing B. Tilman Jolly & Ricardo Martinez, Heart-stopping Action:
Whether it's A Sporting Event or A Rock Concert, Medical Emergencies can Spoil the Fun and
Create Liability Unless Management Plans Ahead, 4 SECURITY MGMT. 94 (2004)).
140. CLARK KENT ERVIN, OPEN TARGET: WHERE AMERICA IS VULNERABLE To ATTACK
158 (2006) (discussing how a terrorist attack on a target such as a sports stadium would be
psychologically devastating to American citizens); see also McCann, supra note 139, at 604.
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cause a terrorist attack on a stadium would endanger tens of
thousands of people and psychologically harm the nation, the govern-
ment has a compelling interest in preventing such an attack.
While protecting stadium patrons from terrorist attacks is a compel-
ling governmental interest, the inquiry cannot end there. The John-
ston court examined whether the threat of such an attack was real and
not merely a general threat.14 1 It could have accepted the generalized
threat of a terrorist attack in the country, or even places of large pub-
lic gatherings, as sufficient evidence of the immediacy of a terrorist
attack on a stadium.1 42 However, when a court is faced with the spe-
cial needs exception as justification for governmental intrusion, every
step in its analysis must be analyzed in a context-specific manner.143
Thus, the Johnston court was correct in not relying on a general threat
of terrorism but rather looking at whether there was a real threat of a
terrorist attack on the Stadium. 144
Commentators have stated that there is a real threat of a terrorist
attack on an NFL stadium, because sports stadiums, and NFL stadi-
ums specifically, are likely targets, and sports occupy a symbolic place
in American culture.145 Further, the Bush Administration has desig-
nated sport stadiums as key assets, which are defined as potential ter-
rorist targets, because they are critical to "the psychic well-being and
stability of the nation.' 46 However, while the Congressional Re-
search Service-which prepares nonpartisan research reports for
141. Johnston v. Tampa Sports Authority, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1266 (M.D. Fla. 2006); see also
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318-19 (1997); Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1311 (11th
Cir. 2004); Ringe v. Romero, 624 F. Supp. 417, 422 (W.D. La. 1985); Collier v. Miller, 414 F.
Supp. 1357, 1362 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
142. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1266, 1268. The court noted that there can be no dispute
regarding the magnitude of the threat of terrorist attacks on the country. Further, testimony by
the President of the Institute of Makers of Explosives indicated that "any large venue or venue
where people gather in great numbers" could be an attractive target for terrorists. Id. at 1268
(emphasis omitted); see also Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1311. There, the city argued that, because of
the constant threat of terrorism the country has faced since 9/11, suspicionless searches at large
gatherings should be constitutional as a matter of law. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1268. The
court rejected this argument. Id.
143. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
144. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1266; see also Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1311 (rejecting a gener-
alized threat of a terrorist attack as sufficient evidence to justify suspicionless searches: "In the
absence of some reason to believe that ... terrorists would target or infiltrate this protest, there
is no basis for using 9/11 as an excuse for searching the protestors."); State v. Seglen, 700 N.W.2d
702, 708 (N.D. 2005) (adopting Bourgeois's analysis and holding that an increased possibility of a
terrorist attack following 9/11 is insufficient to justify suspicionless searches at a hockey arena
without a specific threat to that arena).
145. See Clark, supra note 133, at 709; McCann, supra note 139, at 603-04.
146. ERVIN, supra note 140, at 145 (citing THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE PHYSICAL
PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES AND KEY ASsETs 71 (Feb. 2003), available at http:/
/www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/physical-strategy.pdf).
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members of Congress-and university research centers have prepared
reports on potential terrorist targets in the nation's infrastructure,
they have yet to prepare a report on the terrorist threat to stadiums. 147
If the threat of a terrorist attack on a stadium was substantial in the
government's eyes, it is likely that a research report on such a threat
would be prepared for Congress so that the government, through leg-
islation, could help the private sector ensure citizens' safety at such
places. 148 The lack of reports indicates that the possibility of terrorists
targeting stadiums is low and that the government has decided to err
on the side of caution in reporting stadiums as potential targets based
on a general threat of terrorist attacks on American soil.
While one could argue that stadiums, especially NFL stadiums, fit
the criteria terrorists look for in their targets, the likelihood that they
will be chosen as targets, based on recent terrorist attack patterns 149
and predictions about future terrorist attack patterns, is low. 150 From
1970 until 2005, out of 207 worldwide terrorist attacks, only thirty-two
were executed at venues and events where there was a large public
gathering.15 1 In comparison, there have been fifty-five terrorist at-
147. See Claudia Copeland & Betsy Cody, Terrorism and Security Issues Facing the Water
Infrastructure Sector, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS RS21026 (May 21, 2003); Jonathan Medalia,
Terrorist "Dirty Bombs": A Brief Primer, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS RS21528 (Oct. 29, 2003);
Jonathan Medalia, Terrorist Nuclear Attacks on Seaports: Threat and Response, CRS REPORT
FOR CONGRESS RS21293 (Jan. 24, 2005); David Randall Peterman, Passenger Rail Security:
Overview of Issues, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS RL32625 (Jan. 20, 2006); Clinton H. White-
hurst, Jr., Special Report: Transportation and the Terrorist Threat (Strom Thurmond Inst. 2003).
148. The mission of the Congressional Research Service is to provide Congress with objective
and timely analysis and research on all legislative issues, thereby "supporting an informed na-
tional legislature." Congressional Research Service Employment Home Page, http://www.loc.
gov/crsinfo (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
149. NAT'L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., 2006 COUNTERTERRORISM CALENDAR (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.nctc.gov/docs/ct-calendar_2006.pdf (reporting terrorist attacks-including both
planned attacks that were thwarted and attacks that were eventually carried out-around the
world from 1970 until 2002 by terrorist organizations such as Al-Qai'da, HAMAS, PIRA, ELN,
LRA. MILF, FARC, ETA, RIRA, GRAPO, Al-aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Revenge Falcons of Apo,
Hizballah, and Islamic Jihad Group).
150. PETER CHALK ET AL., TRENDS IN TERRORISM: THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES AND
THE FUTURE OF THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT (2005); Raphael F. Perl, Terrorism and
National Security: Issues and Trends, CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS 1B10119, at 4 (Apr. 21,
2006), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/67848.pdf.
151. This author has used data from the National Counterterrorism Center's Counterterror-
ism Calendar, supra note 149, to calculate this statistic by taking the number of terrorist attacks,
both planned and carried out, where two or more people have been killed or seriously injured to
compile a net total of terrorist attacks from 1970 until 2005. The author then used terrorist
attacks on the following venues or events to compile a net total of attacks on venues or events
where there was a large public gathering: parades, cafes, political meetings or rallies, protests,
shopping centers, marketplaces, hotels, discos, bars, pubs, and sports events.
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tacks on transportation targets. 52 More specifically, only three out of
the thirty-two attacks on large public gatherings took place at sports
stadiums or sports events, and only one occurred inside the United
States. 153 Based on these terrorist patterns, the threat of an attack on
a stadium is minimal both in itself and when compared with the threat
of an attack on other targets. Further, commentators predicting fu-
ture terrorist attack patterns have stated that "terrorism is becoming
less U.S.-focused and more global in scope"1 54 and terrorists will con-
tinue to focus on attacking hard targets, "such as embassies and mili-
tary installations," and "economic targets," such as "prominent
financial institutions."' 155 Some commentators have pointed to a re-
cent tragedy in which a young college student detonated a bomb one
hundred yards away from a college football stadium as evidence of
"possible domestic terrorism and an indication of the vulnerability of
sporting events. ' 156 However, the authorities ruled it an isolated inci-
dent. 57 Further, while the FBI and the Homeland Security Depart-
ment have issued warnings concerning threats against stadiums,
authorities have viewed these threats with great skepticism, and the
warnings were issued "out of an abundance of caution.' 58
152. This author has used data from the National Counterterrorism Center's Counterterror-
ism Calendar, supra note 149, to calculate this statistic by taking the number of terrorist attacks
on the following targets to compile a net total of attacks on transportation targets: airplanes,
airports, buses, bus terminals, commuter trains, underground railway systems, boats, and ports.
153. This author has used data from the National Counterterrorism Center's Counterterror-
ism Calendar, supra note 149, to calculate this statistic. The three attacks on sports stadiums or
sports events were the following: the 2004 attack on a sports stadium in Russia while a celebra-
tion of V-Day was taking place; the 1996 bombing of the Atlanta Olympics; and the 1972 terror-
ist attack on the Olympics in Munich, Germany, in which members of the Israeli Olympic team
were taken hostage.
154. Perl, supra note 150, at 4; accord Jon Basil Utley, Thoughts on Terrorist Targets, ANTI-
WAR.COM, Jan. 6, 2004, http://antiwar.com/utley/?articleid=1900 (arguing that American targets
and civilians overseas are easier targets for terrorists than any structures inside the U.S.).
155. CHALK ET AL., supra note 150, at 16, 23-24; see also Utley, supra note 154 (stating that
past terrorist attacks have all "been against U.S. military or government [structures] ... or major
economic targets").
156. McCann, supra note 139, at 605.
157. Id.
158. Associated Press, Officials Skeptical of Threat Against Stadiums, Oct. 18, 2006, http://
www.intellnet.org/news/2006/10/18/24740-2.html (internal quotation marks omitted); accord
Brian Montopoli, On Basketball, Terrorism, and Hype, CBS NEws PUBLIc EYE, Mar. 13, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.comlblogs/2006/03/13/publiceye/entry1397574.shtml (discussing the same
2006 FBI warning): Brian Ross, Exclusive: FBI Warns of Possible Terror Threat at Sporting
Events, ABC News, Mar. 10, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id-1711158&page=1 (dis-
cussing a warning the FBI issued in 2006 concerning a possible terrorist attack based on an
extremist message board, which encouraged suicide bombings at sports events as a way to kill a
large number of Americans with little costs involved: however, the FBI and the Department of
Homeland Security could not confirm the threat's credibility).
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B. Examination of the Privacy Interest
In examining the privacy interest at stake, courts must look at
whether the individuals subjected to the search have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, 159 as well as the "degree and nature of the intru-
sion entailed by the search."'' 60  The Johnston court was correct in
considering the intrusiveness of the pat-downs and whether patrons
have "a diminished expectation of privacy" while attending a football
game.1 61
Whether an individual's expectation of privacy will be deemed legit-
imate depends in part on whether the individual "asserting the privacy
interest is at home, at work . . . or in a public [place]."1 62 Because
patrons entering an NFL stadium are in public, they arguably have a
diminished expectation of privacy. 163 However, while individuals in
public places may have a diminished expectation of privacy in some
instances, they do not lose all of their constitutional rights when they
leave their homes.164 A person who attends a public event assumes
the risk that her conversations will be overheard or that a stranger
may accidentally brush up against her, but it does not follow that such
a person assumes the risk of a stranger intentionally touching her
body during a pat-down. 165 While a person in public clearly exposes
her body and outer garments to a visual examination by others, that
159. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995); Ringe v. Romero, 624 F.
Supp. 417, 420 (W.D. La. 1985).
160. Ringe, 634 F. Supp. at 420; accord Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1145 (M.D.N.C.
1977); Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357, 1364 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Jensen v. City of Pontiac, 317
N.W.2d 619, 622 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
161. Johnston v. Tampa Sports Authority, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1269 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
162. Vernonia Sch. Dist 47J, 515 U.S. at 654.
163. Courts have long held that individuals are entitled to the highest expectation of privacy
in their homes. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (" 'At the very core' of the
Fourth Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion."' (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
511 (1961))). In contrast, courts have held that individuals are entitled to a diminished expecta-
tion of privacy while in public. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (holding
that an arrest warrant is not required for an arrest in a public place even though such a warrant is
required to arrest an individual in her home); see also Sports Security Panel, supra note 4, at 375
("I think that the expectation of privacy is very low at a public event." (remarks by panelist
Norman Siegel)).
164. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303. 1315-16 (11th Cir. 2004). "Conversations in the open
would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectations of privacy under the cir-
cumstances would be unreasonable." Id. at 1315 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). "In their persons and property, however, individuals 'are
not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step from their homes onto the public
sidewalks."' Id. (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1979)).
165. See Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1315; Ringe, 624 F. Supp. at 420; Claussen, supra note 76, at
165.
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person does not expose her body and outer garments to physical ex-
amination by others. 166 Thus, the Johnston court was correct in find-
ing that stadium patrons do not have a diminished expectation of
privacy as to their persons.1 67
In examining the privacy interest in special needs cases, courts also
look at the degree and nature of the intrusion upon that privacy inter-
est.168 Proponents of mandatory pat-downs argue that these searches
are not highly intrusive, because they are brief, involve merely the
touching of outer garments, 69 and do not rise to the level of a full
search of the person,1 70 a strip search, 171 or a body cavity search.172
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that, while a pat-down
may be brief, it is still an invasive intrusion upon one's privacy rights
and may often be a humiliating and frightening experience for the
subject of the pat-down. 73 As the Johnston court noted, other courts
have followed the Supreme Court's lead in concluding that pat-downs
are a highly invasive intrusion upon one's privacy. 174 Further, pat-
downs have been viewed as more intrusive than searches that have
166. See Ringe, 624 F. Supp. at 420 ("Society certainly recognizes that individuals entering a
public ... establishment retain a legitimate expectation of privacy as to their persons, as well as
to their possessions, that excludes the possibility of a personal search."); see also Bourgeois, 387
F.3d at 1315-16.
167. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.
168. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
169. McCann, supra note 139, at 586, 606.
170. A full search of a person-which includes not only touching the outer garments but also
touching underneath the garments-has been permitted by the court only in instances of a
search incident to an arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
171. Strip search "generally refers to an inspection of a naked individual, without any scrutiny
of the subject's body cavities." United States v. Barnes, 443 F. Supp. 2d 248, 252 (D.R.I. 2006)
(quoting Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 561 n.3 (1st Cir. 1985)). Such searches are permitted
pursuant to an arrest or in a prison setting only where there is individualized suspicion that the
arrestee or inmate harbors contraband. Id.
172. Body cavity searches can be either visual (a "visual inspection of the anal or genital
areas") or manual ("some degree of touching or probing of body cavities"). Id. (quoting Black-
burn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 561 n.3 (1st Cir. 1985)). Similar to strip searches, body cavity
searches are permitted in a prison setting or following an arrest only where there is individual-
ized suspicion that the arrestee or inmate harbors contraband. Id.
173. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968) ("[A pat-down] is a serious intrusion upon the sanc-
tity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to
be undertaken lightly.").
174. Johnston v. Tampa Sports Authority, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1270 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (quot-
ing United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 807 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[A] frisk is considered a gross
invasion of one's privacy.")).
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been justified by a special need, such as visual inspections 75 and mag-
netometer searches. 176
Although the Johnston court failed to address this issue fully, the
emotional effects of pat-downs on their subjects should also be consid-
ered in determining their intrusiveness. One of the main reasons pat-
downs should be deemed highly intrusive is the humiliation that many
individuals-especially women-experience when subjected to a pat-
down. 177 One woman who was subjected to a pat-down at Heinz
Field17 8 commented, "I'm just very uncomfortable with somebody
feeling me up," and described the pat-downs as "more like unneces-
sary roughness." 179 There are some who scoff at women's complaints
about the embarrassing nature of pat-downs, stating that "a physical
pat-down [is] a small price to pay for security."'180 However, as one
woman noted, "[m]en don't know how offensive it is to be touched by
anyone when you don't want to be touched."' 181 Yet, despite dismissal
of the humiliation complaints concerning pat-downs, it is not just
women who have felt humiliated by these searches. One commenta-
tor stated that "a guy [she] know[s] said a male screener ... recently
stuck a hand down the front of his pants, making him feel 'totally
manhandled.' 1 82
Pat-downs are highly intrusive not only because of the potential hu-
miliation involved, but also because there is a danger that some secur-
ity personnel will perform the pat-downs in an inappropriate
175. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000) ("Physically invasive inspection is
simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection."); Jensen, 317 N.W.2d at 624 ("A physical
pat-down search by a guard is more intrusive than a limited visual search.").
176. Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806 ("The passing through a magnetometer has none of the indig-
nities involved in ... a frisk. The use of the device does not annoy, frighten or humiliate those
who pass through it."), see also Symposium Panel, supra note 4, at 397 ("The pat-down is ...
more intrusive than walking through a door that has some X-ray capacity . (remarks by
panelist Norman Siegel)).
177. See Maureen Dowd, Hiding Breast Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2004, at A35; Dorren
Klausnitzer, Are Airport Security Pat-Downs Too Personal?. TENNESSEAN.COM. Nov. 25, 2004,
www.tennessean.com/locallarchivesl04/ll/61998018.shtml; Jessica D. Lew, Secondary Screening
Procedures for Airports: Putdowns for Pat-Downs, LAWORLD, Nov. 2005, at 1-2; Joe Sharkey.
Many Women Say Airport Pat-Downs Are a Humiliation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2004, at Al.
178. Heinz Field is the stadium where the NFL's Pittsburgh Steelers plays its home games.
Moustafa Ayad, New Era Dawns at Heinz Field as Pat-Down Searches Begin, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZET-'E, Aug. 16, 2005, at Al, A3, available at http://www.postgazette.com/pg/05228/554642.
stm.
179. Id.
180. Sharkey, supra note 177.
181. Id. (quoting Betty Spence, President of the National Association for Female Executives).
182. Dowd, supra note 177.
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manner. 183 This results in the security personnel subjecting women 8 4
not only to humiliation, but also to fear of sexual harassment, abuse,
or painful recollection of previous experiences of such harassment or
abuse.'8 5 Numerous women and commentators have described pat-
downs by security personnel as sexual harassment and not just mere
security measures.' 8 6 One commentator stated that "[i]t is ironic that
what would normally be considered 'assault' on the street is often the
standard practice of screeners at ... security checkpoints."' 187
Even government officials, such as former Representative Helen
Chenoweth, have expressed outrage at pat-downs and commented
that these searches conflict with what our society has deemed accept-
able and appropriate bodily contact between strangers. 18 Chenoweth
stated that "[w]e have programs teaching children that these areas are
private and yet we have our government patting us down [in those
areas]. There's something wrong with that."'1 9 Those who have ex-
perienced inappropriate pat-downs have reported it to consist of the
following:
[R]ough, rude, and humiliating manhandling and groping of their
breasts and crotch areas, demeaning sexual comments, and being
forced to remove business jackets in full view of crowds, despite the
183. See Audrey Hudson, TSA 'Pat-Downs' Cross the Line for Some Fliers, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 2004, at A3; Klausnitzer, supra note 177; Sharkey, supra note 177.
184. This author does not mean to suggest that men do not experience fear of sexual harass-
ment or abuse or that men are not victims of such abuse. However, the author concentrates on
women as the more likely gender to experience such fear and recollections during inappropriate
pat-downs, because, as some reports have suggested, women are far more likely to experience
sexual abuse or harassment than men. See, e.g., Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Prevalence,
Incidence, and Consequences of Violence Against Women: Findings from the National Violence
Against Women Survey, Nov. 1998, at 3, 11 (reporting that, while "nearly one-fifth [of women]
reported being raped at some time in their lives," only "1 of 33 U.S. men has experienced an
attempted or completed rape as a child and/or an adult").
185. See Hudson, supra note 183; Klausnitzer, supra note 177; Sharkey, supra note 177.
186. See Hudson, supra note 183 (stating that "some say [a pat-down by government officials]
amounts to sexual groping"); Klausnitzer, supra note 177 ("What they're doing is subjecting
women to very aggressive, intrusive searches [and we are] worried that this is, in fact, sexual
harassment." (quoting Barry Steinhardt, of the ACLU's New York office, concerning pat-
downs)); Sharkey, supra note 177 ("Routinely, my breasts are being cupped, my behind is being
felt . . . [a]nd I feel I can't fight it." (quoting Lu Chekowsky, an advertising executive from
Portland, Oregon)).
187. Lew, supra note 177.
188. Hudson, supra note 183; see also Suspicionless Searches Make Fans Less Free But Not
Any Safer, Oct. 13, 2005, http://www.aclu.org/crimjustice/searchseizure/21144prs20051013.html
[hereinafter Suspicionless Searches] (noting that Patrick Manteiga, the Chair of the TSA, has
publicly criticized the pat-downs as being intrusive).
189. Hudson, supra note 183.
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fact that it is a widespread convention in our society for women to
wear only bras or other undergarments underneath such jackets. 90
Commentators have reported that the number of complaints alleging
sexual harassment or abuse by security personnel in the course of per-
forming pat-downs has been significant.1 91 The existence of these
complaints has been acknowledged by the authorities, such as the
TSA, which reported that, in the period from October 1, 2004 through
February 28, 2005, it received 1,471 pat-down complaints. 92 Al-
though the TSA emphasized that the number of complaints received
comprised only .003% of the pat-downs performed during that pe-
riod, 193 in December 2004, it responded by making adjustments to its
pat-down procedures. 194 Because the adjustment came "after [TSA]
officials met ... to discuss the large number of complaints from trav-
elers," it suggests that the dangers of abuse and harassment by secur-
ity personnel conducting the pat-downs were real. 95 In response to
the dangers pat-downs present to the emotional and physical well-be-
ing of women, at least one feminist website has encouraged women to
take action against pat-downs. 196 The website suggests that women
simply should not allow security personnel to touch them in an inap-
propriate manner in the name of security, but rather should report it
to local and state police for what it is: a crime.1 97
Beyond the short-term emotional effects of pat-downs, the experi-
ence of such a highly intrusive action may have long-term negative
effects on some women. Women who have experienced sexual as-
sault, sexist remarks, or sexist environments "report increases in nega-
tive emotions, including depression, anxiety, and anger" that persist
beyond the initial experience.' 98 Thus, it is likely that a fear of sexual
190. ACLU, TSA Pat-Down Search Abuse, Dec. 21, 2004, http://www.aclu.org/privacy/gen/157
77res20041221.html [hereinafter Pat-Down Search Abuse]; Lew, supra note 177 ("Many women
have reported rough, rude, and humiliating manhandling, and sometimes even overtly sexual
groping by security officials.").
191. Pat-Down Search Abuse, supra note 190.
192. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF THE TRANS-
PORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S USE OF PAT-DOWNS IN SCREENING PROCEDURES,
OIG-06-10, Nov. 2005, at 3.
193. Id. at 2.
194. Sara Kehaulani Goo, TSA Modifies Airport Pat-Downs, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2004, at
A13.
195. Id.
196. Matthew Reed, How to Fight Back Against Pat-Downs by Airport Security Screeners, Feb.
1, 2006, http://www.ifeminists.net/introduction/deitorials/2006/0201 reed.html.
197. Id.
198. Lori E. Ross & Brenda Toner, Sexism & Women's Mental Health, WOMEN & ENVIRON-
MENTS, Fall 2003, at 34 (reporting on studies of "the impact of explicitly sexist environments and
experiences on women's physical and mental health"); see also WORLD HEALTH ORO., WOMEN'S
MENTAL HEALTH: AN EVIDENCE BASED REVIEW 65-81 (2000), available at http://whqlibdoc.
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harassment or recollection of such an experience brought on by a pat-
down search would also increase these negative emotions in women.
The danger of pat-downs resulting in negative, long-lasting emotional
effects is especially significant in the United States where "[e]very
year approximately 132,000 women report that they have been victims
of rape or attempted rape" 199 and "every two and a half minutes...
someone is sexually assaulted. '200 These statistics suggest that a large
percentage of American women have experienced sexual abuse or
harassment and, thus, a large portion of those who may be subjected
to a pat-down may experience recollection of this abuse or harassment
or may fear that it will happen again.
Some commentators have argued that the emotional effects of pat-
downs should not be considered when determining whether these
searches are intrusive, because the NFL pat-down policy is indiscrimi-
nate in nature.201 The argument is that, when a search policy is not
selective and, as in the case of the NFL policy, applies to every patron
entering the stadium, the search subjects are "much less likely to be
frightened or annoyed by the intrusion," and, thus, the emotional ef-
fects of the pat-downs are slight or nonexistent.20 2 One commentator
criticized the Johnston court for not addressing the indiscriminate na-
ture of the pat-down policy in its analysis. 20 3 While this omission is
contrary to the precedent of examining the indiscriminate or discrimi-
nate nature of the search in determining its invasiveness, 204 the indis-
who.int/hq/2000/WHO MSD_MDP_00.1.pdf (stating that "[v]iolence against women ... is prob-
ably the most prevalent and certainly, the most emblematic gender based cause of depression in
women"); Richard F. Geist, Sexually Related Trauma, 6 EMERGENCY MED. CLINICS N. AM. 439,
462 (1988) (stating that "[a] post-traumatic psychological syndrome, with both short-term and
long-term dysfunctional elements, almost uniformly follows [a sexual assault]"); Paul E. Mullen
et al., Impact of Sexual and Physical Abuse on Women's Mental Health, LANCET, Apr. 16, 1988,
at 8590 (stating that domestic violence, which can include physical and sexual violence against a
woman, has an even stronger association with mental disorders than does sexual abuse in
childhood).
199. Nat'l Org. for Women, Violence Against Women in the United States, http://www.now.
org/issues/violence/stats.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
200. Rape, Abuse & Incest Nat'l Network, http://www.RAINN.org (follow "Statistics") (last
visited Feb. 13, 2008).
201. Clark, supra note 133, at 740 ("[C]ourts have held that when a search policy is applied
indiscriminately, and therefore not directed at isolated spectators, no stigma attaches to embar-
rass the individual subjected to the search.").
202. Id. (quoting Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452 (1990)).
203. Id. ("The [Johnston] court completely ignored the indiscriminate nature of the NFL pat-
down policy; other courts should not duplicate that mistake.").
204. See Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357, 1364 (S.D. Tex. 1976). The court was concerned
with the fact that the searches in question were "not applied indiscriminately to all persons
entering the respective facilities. Instead, the record reflects that the decision to search, as well
as degree of the ensuing search, are left entirely to the discretion of the searching guard." Id.;
accord Ringe v. Romero, 624 F. Supp. 417, 420 (W.D. La. 1985) ("The courts have held that
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criminate nature of a search is not the only-or the most significant-
factor in determining whether the search is intrusive. As Justice
O'Connor pointed out, there is as substantial a danger of great intru-
sion upon a person's privacy rights in an even-handed search as there
is in a search that singles out only certain individuals.20 5 Thus, while
the Johnston court should have addressed the indiscriminate nature of
the NFL pat-down policy, it is unlikely that the court would have
found the pat-downs less intrusive solely because they were indiscrim-
inate, because the same dangers of humiliation, fright, annoyance, and
resentment of the government were still present.
C. The Efficacy of Pat-Downs
After balancing the governmental and privacy interests at stake,
courts must also consider the search's efficacy, focusing on whether
the search can eliminate or reduce the risk to the public.20 6 Thus, the
Johnston court followed precedent in examining whether the pat-
downs were an essential part of terrorism protection.207 Supporters of
the NFL pat-down policy point out that pat-downs can be effective in
preventing or deterring a terrorist attack, because they allow the se-
curity personnel to detect suicide bombs made from material other
than metal, such as plastic. 208 However, the mere possibility that a
pat-down could detect a suicide bomb does not render it an effective
search. There should also be an evaluation of how the search is im-
plemented, who is carrying it out, and what problems it may cause in
order to determine the true efficacy of the search. Thus, the Johnston
where the decision to search is left entirely to the discretion of the searching officers, the intru-
sion can be particularly great.").
205. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 670 (1995) (O'Connor J., dissenting):
[T]here is no indication in the historical material that the Framers' opposition to gen-
eral searches stemmed solely from the fact that they allowed officials to single out indi-
viduals for arbitrary reasons, and thus that officials could render them reasonable
simply by making sure to extend their search to every house in a given area or to every
person in a given group.
Id. (emphasis in original).
206. See Wilkinson v. Forst, 832 F.2d 1330, 1338 (2d Cir. 1987); Ringe, 624 F. Supp. at 423;
Gaioni v. Folmar, 460 F. Supp. 10, 14 (M.D. Ala. 1978); Collier, 414 F. Supp. at 1363; Jensen v.
City of Pontiac, 317 N.W.2d 619, 623-24 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
207. 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1270-71 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
208. See McCann, supra note 139, at 607 ("Israeli security and military personnel, for instance,
routinely use [pat-downs] because suicide vests may be obscured underneath terrorists' cloth-
ing." (citing to Joel Mowbray, Florida Judge Shockingly Halts Security Searches at Games, Oct.
31, 2005)); Clark, supra note 133, at 739 ("[A] pat-down search may be the most effective and
efficient way to ferret out plastic explosives."); Sports Security Panel, supra note 4, at 397 ("That
is why [the NFL] also employed the pat-down, because we were concerned about individuals
bringing in large amounts of C4 plastic strapped to their bodies." (remarks by panelist Milton
Ahlerich)).
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court correctly examined factors such as the true motivation for im-
plementing the search and the manner in which the search was imple-
mented.20 9 Further, the Johnston court correctly determined that the
pat-downs were ineffective in preventing a terrorist attack210 in light
of the fact that the pat-downs were brief,211 performed by untrained
personnel,212 easy to deceive, 213 and more likely used by the NFL to
provide patrons with a false sense of security than to provide them
with effective security measures,21 4 because their effectiveness has not
been tested. 215
The pat-downs at NFL stadiums are ineffective, because they are
too brief to allow any meaningful opportunity to detect suicide bombs.
As one commentator pointed out, stadium security personnel face the
"situational pressure of impatient fans seeking to enter the stadium, as
well as... the practical necessity of preventing long and slow-moving
entrance lines. ' 216 Thus, because of the need to move lines quickly,
security personnel conduct brief pat-downs that will likely not give
them an opportunity to actually feel the person's garment for any
small bulges or wires that may be concealed underneath. 21 7 Also, as
some experts have pointed out, the pat-downs are ineffective, because
they are performed by personnel who "seldom possess sufficient anti-
terrorist training. '218 If anti-terrorism security measures are to be ef-
fective, the personnel implementing those measures must be properly
trained.219 Without such training, the probability of a pat-down actu-
ally detecting materials that can be used in a terrorist attack disap-
pears. Some critics have noted that, besides being "less than well-
trained," stadium security personnel are also "less than engaged. '220
Further, the pat-downs are ineffective, because, as one commentator
pointed out, "terrorist[s] can still conceal material below the waist or
otherwise bypass questionably-trained security," because pat-downs
209. 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1265.
210. Id.
211. McCann, supra note 139, at 610 (noting that the pat-downs take three to five seconds).
212. Id. at 604.
213. Id. at 607.
214. See Suspicionless Searches, supra note 188; McCann, supra note 139, at 609; Andrew
Potter, If Security Fails, There is Always a Scapegoat: Freedom, MACLEAN'S, Sept. 12, 2006,
available at http://www.macleans.ca (search by article title).
215. McCann, supra note 139, at 608.
216. Id. at 604.
217. Id. at 604, 610.
218. Id. at 604.
219. Benjamin D. Goss et al., Primary Principles of Post-9/Ii Stadium Security in the United
States: Transatlantic Implications from British Practices, available at http://www.iaam.org/cvms/
Post%20911%20Stadium%20Security.doc (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
220. McCann, supra note 139, at 609.
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are usually performed above the waist.221 Additionally, because the
pat-downs are performed on every patron entering the stadium, ter-
rorists have the opportunity to observe exactly how the pat-downs are
being conducted. They can then adjust the location of their explosive
materials to areas that are either not patted down or are subject to a
light pat-down. Another significant factor rendering pat-downs inef-
fective as a method of reducing or eliminating the threat of a terrorist
attack is the fact that pat-downs create a public environment with a
high concentration of people that is an even more accessible target to
potential terrorists than a stadium, because there are no security mea-
sures for screening those who are on public streets.222 One observer
has stated that the NFL's pat-down policy may in fact "expose those
gathering at stadiums entrances to a greater danger. 223
Yet the three most telling facts concerning the ineffectiveness of the
pat-downs are that the NFL has not tested their efficacy,224 the NFL
waited until 2005 to implement such measures, and no other sports
leagues have implemented pat-down searches as anti-terrorist mea-
sures.225 Some commentators have puzzled at "why the NFL, unlike
other pro sports leagues, would utilize [the pat-downs] and whether
the NFL trusts its fans less than [other sports leagues], or [if it] is just
more paranoid. ' 226 One commentator even asserted that pat-downs
at football stadiums "have not led to the discovery of a single item of
contraband, let alone terrorist material. ' 227 In light of these circum-
stances, it is doubtful that the pat-downs are effective. Further, if they
were, it is likely that other sports leagues would also utilize them.
Critics would likely respond that, unless these measures were effective
in protecting the patrons, the NFL would not waste its resources on
such measures. However, the NFL employed pat-downs regardless of
their effectiveness, because they create the illusion that the NFL is
221. Id. at 607; Sally Kalson, What Will We Endure for the Sake of Security?, PiTrSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 17, 2005, at A2.
222. McCann, supra note 139, at 607, 609.
223. ACLU, Florida Judge Stops Pat-Down Searches at Buccaneers Games, Oct. 28, 2005,
available at http://www.aclu.org/crimjustice/searchseizure/21185prs20051028.html (last visited
Feb. 13, 2008) (remarks by Rebecca Steele, ACLU's West Florida Regional Director and the
lead attorney in Johnston).
224. McCann, supra note 139, at 608.
225. Richard Rhodes, Judge Stands Up For Civil Liberties, July 31, 2006, http://www.watch-
blog.com/thirdparty/archives/004036.html (stating that the pat-down measures are unique to the
NFL, as the NBA, MLB, and NHL have no such policies); see also McCann, supra note 139, at
607, 609.
226. McCann, supra note 139, at 609 (internal quotation marks omitted).
227. Id. at 608.
[Vol. 57:755
2008] JOHNSTON V. TAMPA SPORTS AUTHORITY 783
concerned with fans' safety.22 8 Even authorities charged with imple-
menting the NFL policy have "publicly criticized the pat-down
searches as ... providing a false sense of security. '22 9 Based on these
suggestions, it is likely that the concern in implementing such mea-
sures is not the effectiveness in protecting the fans, but merely the
visibility of the NFL's security measures to protect fans. A pat-down
of every fan entering the stadium is a highly visible showing of secur-
ity measures, and it tends to make the fans feel that security is being
taken seriously. This is likely the exact response that the NFL hopes
to generate. Ultimately, the NFL is a business. As such, it is con-
cerned with the possible loss of customers due to fears of an attack.230
Thus, it wants to implement the security measures that are most visi-
ble to patrons and most effective in alleviating their fears, even
though they may not be the most effective in actually preventing ter-
rorism. 231 These pat-downs are not really meant to protect patrons
but merely to convey a message that they should continue to spend
their money on attending sports events, because visible security mea-
sures are clearly in place to protect them.
D. Balancing of the Interests
After examining the privacy interest at stake, the governmental in-
terest at stake, and the efficacy of the means chosen to achieve the
governmental interest, courts must balance these competing interests
to determine whether the special needs doctrine justifies the govern-
mental intrusion. 232 Only "where the privacy interests implicated by
the search are minimal, and where an important governmental inter-
est furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy" if the in-
trusion were prohibited, can a special need justify a suspicionless
search.233 The Johnston court, therefore, correctly balanced the threat
228. Id. at 609 (stating that the pat-downs "merely manifest a 'feel good' measure that deludes
fans into overestimating the NFL's concern for their safety"); see Potter, supra note 214, at 7
("[A] great deal of what passes for security in our society is symbolic, a device for convincing the
public that it is okay to go to a hockey game or take a trip to see relatives.").
229. See Suspicionless Searches, supra note 188.
230. Angelo Bruscas, Extra Security Hounding Sports Fans Everywhere, SEATrLE POsT-INTEL-
LIGENCER REP., Mar. 26, 2003, http://seattlepi.com/othersports/114258-security26.shtml (stating
that, besides providing security, teams also face the concern of driving fans away because of a
lack of security measures or an overabundance of security measures).
231. See Suspicionless Searches, supra note 188.
232. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 646 (1995); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989); Skinner
v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); Ringe v. Romero, 624 F. Supp. 417,420
(W.D. La. 1985); Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1145 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Jensen v. City of
Pontiac, 317 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
233. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624).
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of a terrorist attack on a stadium with patrons' privacy interests.2 34
Further, the court rightly concluded that the privacy interest was not
outweighed by the governmental interest and, therefore, the special
needs doctrine could not justify the pat-down policy.235
As discussed above, patrons' privacy interest in their persons was
not diminished by the fact that they were at a public gathering.236 Ad-
ditionally, the intrusion of the pat-down search upon the privacy inter-
est at stake was great. 237 However, while the governmental interest
was compelling, it had little immediacy.2 38 Finally, the governmental
interest was not furthered by the intrusion, because the pat-downs
were not effective. 239 Thus, the privacy interest implicated by the pat-
downs was not minimal, and the governmental interest, though impor-
tant, was not placed in jeopardy if the suspicionless pat-downs were
prohibited. As one commentator cautioned, "the threat of terrorism
at large gathering events should not be considered sufficient justifica-
tion to deviate from the value judgment embedded in the Constitution
that freedom from the privacy invasion of unreasonable searches is
worth protecting, despite the concomitant limits on governmental
ability to provide greater security. ' 240 Unless the government can
prove that there is a real and substantial threat to NFL stadiums and
that implementation of security measures other than pat-downs would
jeopardize the public safety, patrons' constitutional rights must be
given the highest priority.
V. JOHNSTON'S IMPACT UPON CIVIL LIBERTIES
AND PATRONS' SAFETY
This Part explores Johnston's likely impact upon the constitutional
rights of citizens and the ability of the NFL and other sports leagues to
protect their patrons during sports events.2 4' It discusses how the de-
cision will likely help safeguard constitutional rights protected by the
Fourth Amendment and, in turn, prevent terrorists from achieving
their goals.2 42 Further, it surveys a number of alternative avenues that
234. Johnston v. Tampa Sports Authority, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1272 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
235. Id.
236. See Ringe, 624 F. Supp. at 420; Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1315-16 (11th Cir.
2004).
237. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17, 25 (1968).
238. See Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1269.
239. See McCann, supra note 139, at 608.
240. Claussen, supra note 76, at 172.
241. See infra notes 244-275 and accompanying text.
242. See infra notes 244-255 and accompanying text.
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do not involve suspicionless pat-downs, but continue to be open to the
NFL following Johnston.2 43
A. The Road from Suspicionless Pat-Downs to the Abandonment of
Constitutional Rights
Proponents of pat-downs argue that the Johnston court should have
erred on the side of caution and extended the special needs exception
to suspicionless searches at NFL stadiums; however, such an extension
would likely lead to a "slippery slope."'24 4 The slippery slope theory
states that, initially, in the name of national security, the government
"trims some rights, which raises little alarm at the time," and then
curbs other, more important rights until, gradually, citizens are
stripped of all rights, and it is too late to stop the evisceration of con-
stitutional guarantees.2 45 Therefore, it could be argued that, if the
Johnston court had allowed the government to conduct suspicionless
pat-downs at NFL stadiums, it would lead to suspicionless pat-downs
at other public gatherings until nearly every time a person left her
home she would be searched by the government without any suspi-
cion.2 46 Instead, Johnston greatly protects constitutional rights guar-
anteed by the Fourth Amendment, which one commentator has
described as rights that should be protected most fiercely.247 That
commentator argued that courts should be extremely protective of the
Fourth Amendment, because it is "more susceptible to the changing
fortunes of public opinion than any other constitutional provision. It
prohibits 'unreasonable' searches and seizures [and] [i]n a society
drenched in fear and fighting terror, my sense is that almost anything
necessary to make us feel safe will be deemed reasonable by most. '248
One writer pointed out that, unlike people in countries such as
Israel-where metal detectors, bomb-sniffing dogs, and undercover
surveillance teams are part of daily life-the "American people sim-
ply won't tolerate the kinds of draconian countermeasures that Israe-
lis accept without complaint. ' '249 "One of the reasons we do not do
243. See infra notes 256-275 and accompanying text.
244. AMITAI ETZIONI, How PATRIOTIC IS THE PATRIOT ACT? FREEDOM VERSUS SECURITY
IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM 11 (2004).
245. Id.
246. See Catherine Yang et al., The State Of Surveillance, BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 8, 2005, http://
www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_32/b3946001_mz001.htm (describing a possible fu-
ture United States where surveillance technology is used to monitor citizens and search their
belongings and citizens themselves when they are out in the public).
247. Norm Pattis, The Shrinking Fourth Amendment, Jan. 17, 2006, http://federalism.typepad.
com/crime-federalism/2006/01/the-shrinking-f.html.
248. Id.
249. ERVIN, supra note 140, at 158.
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some of [the] things [that other countries do to prevent terrorism] is
because it is not in our tradition. ' 250 Therefore, the Johnston court's
refusal to extend the special needs doctrine to searches at NFL stadi-
ums protects American rights and traditions. Further, "the courts
seem to be of the view that by characterizing such spectator searches
as negligible intrusions and allowing them to become commonplace,
we are damaging the ability of America's youth to appreciate the criti-
cal importance of preserving our constitutional freedoms. '251 If the
government is permitted presently to minimize or extinguish citizens'
right to be free from suspicionless searches based on the fear of a
terrorist attack, then future generations will either be unaware that
such a right exists or will not place great importance on it. In either
scenario, the right may be lost. Thus, Johnston will likely impact fu-
ture generations by preserving the Fourth Amendment right.
Finally, Johnston is likely to prevent terrorism from disrupting the
democratic freedoms guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. As one
writer points out, there are those who "seek to suspend major parts of
the Constitution and its Bill of Rights until we win the war against
terrorism. ' 252 Yet, according to the writer, the Bill of Rights is "the
rule of law that makes us what we are. '253
More importantly, as one commentator stated, when we suspend
our rights in response to terrorism, "we erode and violate the very
freedoms and liberties that the authors of terrorism themselves want
to destroy. '254 Therefore, if Johnston had instead permitted suspi-
cionless pat-downs at NFL stadiums, it could have been seen as a deci-
sion that enabled terrorism to accomplish its task of disrupting
democratic governments like that of United States and the freedoms
those governments bestow upon their citizens. As Senator Leahy
said, "we don't protect ourselves by bending or even shredding our
Constitution. We protect ourselves by upholding our Constitution
and demonstrating to the rest of the world we will defend ourselves,
but we will do it also by defending our core values.' 255 Thus, Johnston
will likely protect Americans from terrorism by defending the Consti-
250. Sports Security Panel, supra note 4, at 399 (commenting on why, unlike the national air-
line of Israel, U.S. airlines are not required to seal the cockpit before any passengers board
planes).
251. Claussen, supra note 76, at 165.
252. ETZIONI, supra note 244, at 1.
253. Id.
254. Amanda Ripley, How Much Risk Will We Take?, TIME, Aug. 13, 2006, available at http:/I
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1226170,00.html.
255. Amitai Etzioni, Rights and Responsibilities After 9/11, available at http://www.gwu.edu/
-ccps/documents/2003After9-11.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
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tution and not allowing terrorism to scare courts into abandoning the
constitutional requirements for searches by the government.
B. Ensuring the Governmental Interest without Violating Patrons'
Rights: Other Avenues the NFL Can Pursue
Proponents of the NFL pat-down policy argue that Johnston is a
blow to stadium security and that it places the lives of millions of pa-
trons entering NFL stadiums each week in jeopardy.256 However,
Johnston's impact is not the triumph of freedom over security, because
security would not have been served by these suspicionless pat-downs.
"The NFL's suspicionless search policy will not make fans any safer,
but it will make us all less free. '' 257 More importantly, suspicionless
pat-downs are not the only means to ensure the safety of its patrons
entering stadiums. Rather, the NFL has at its disposal ample means
of protecting its patrons without violating constitutional requirements.
In fact, the Bourgeois court stated that police could conduct pat-
downs if they had reasonable suspicion that a person had a weapon
and could conduct a full-fledged search if they had probable cause to
believe she was carrying a weapon.258 Similarly, government agencies
handling security at NFL stadiums could still conduct pat-downs as
long as they have reasonable suspicion that a patron could be carrying
improvised explosives.
The NFL could also use technology to protect patrons without vio-
lating their privacy. One commentator in the technology industry
stated that, "[i]f you want to reduce risk, video is the way to do it."1259
Thus, the NFL could use video surveillance as a means of protection,
especially because "searches of personal identity information that util-
ize merged high tech surveillance and information technologies might
survive a constitutional challenge." 260 Further, at least one court has
stated that "[t]he right of [government] to observe patrons entering [a
stadium] is clearly permissible. '' 261 Thus, it is likely that courts would
permit the use of more extensive video surveillance security systems
or the use of forthcoming technologies, such as video cameras that
256. Mowbray, supra note 208.
257. See Suspicionless Searches, supra note 188 (quoting Rebecca Harrison Steele, ACLU's
West Florida Regional Director and the lead attorney in Johnston v. Tampa Sports Authority).
258. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1316 (11th Cir. 2004).
259. 30 Million Surveillance Cameras in U.S., Aug. 8, 2006, available at http://archive.new-
smax.comlarchives/ic/2006/8/8/63102.shtml (quoting Peter Tu, scientist at GE).
260. Claussen, supra note 76, at 172.
261. Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1144 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
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may help detect terrorists.2 62 Beyond the advantage of such security
measures passing constitutional muster, video surveillance has proven
successful. For example, in Great Britain, "the installation of closed-
circuit television cameras at British soccer stadiums during the mid-
1980's proved to be a vital component in hooligan policing. 263
Additionally, the NFL could continue to use security measures al-
ready in place that have not raised constitutional questions. One such
measure is the use of metal detectors and scanners. Although the
Eleventh Circuit recently held that the suspicionless magnetometer
searches at a public protest could not be justified under the special
needs exception, 264 other circuits have upheld suspicionless magne-
tometer searches at large public gatherings. For example, in Wilkin-
son, the Second Circuit held that mass pat-down searches of persons
entering a public rally violated the Fourth Amendment, but that po-
lice could conduct general magnetometer searches at rallies without
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.265 Further, metal detectors
and scanners were used in such high-profile sports events as the 2001
World Series opening game at Yankee Stadium, the 2002 New Orleans
Super Bowl, and the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympics without raising any
constitutional questions. 266 Another measure is the use of a "no pass"
policy, which provides that ticket holders are not allowed to leave the
stadium and return during a game. 267 Further, the NFL can continue
to ban certain items inside stadiums-including backpacks, umbrellas,
containers, and coolers 268-because, in Wheaton, the United States
District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina stated that
"nothing in the Constitution forbids ... authorities from making rea-
sonable rules and regulations concerning what may be brought into
the [stadium] or from enforcing such rules by normal police
procedures. '2 69
Finally, the NFL could spend the money currently being used to
conduct pat-downs-which reportedly averages "$10,000 a
game" 27 0-to strengthen and add commonsense security measures.
262. 30 Million Surveillance Cameras in U.S., supra note 259 (discussing video cameras that
can detect explosives by recognizing electromagnetic waves given off by objects and cameras
that pinpoint distress in a crowd by recognizing erratic body movements).
263. Goss et al., supra note 219, at 15.
264. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1316 (l1th Cir. 2004).
265. 832 F.2d 1330, 1341 (2d Cir. 1987).
266. Sports Security Panel, supra note 4, at 370.
267. U. Va. Enacts New Security Measures at Stadium, INSIDE UVA ONLINE, Sept. 28-Oct. 4,
2001, http://www.virginia.edu/insideuva/2001/30/security.html.
268. Id.
269. Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1144 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
270. Hermann, supra note 2.
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One such measure could include additional training for security per-
sonnel. As one commentator stated, "[t]o be ready to effectively pre-
empt or react to terror strikes, [stadium] workers at every level must
receive timely [and effective] security training."'271 Another commen-
tator pointed out that, "[a]ccording to some experts, stadium security
personnel seldom possess sufficient anti-terrorist training .. 272
Therefore, the money now used to conduct pat-downs could be better
spent on training security personnel, because security training of
venue workers is the "best-kept secret" for ensuring patrons' safety.273
Further, the NFL could use the money spent on conducting pat-downs
to launch media campaigns emphasizing greater patron awareness and
reporting of suspicious activity to security personnel. Public aware-
ness is one of the most important means of fighting terrorism. 274 Fi-
nally, the money can be used to better protect the physical areas
around the stadiums. For example, one security agency recommended
increasing perimeter lighting, maintaining vegetation around the pe-
rimeters, and installing special locking devices on manhole covers in
and around facilities. 275
VI. CONCLUSION
While the governmental interest in protecting the public from a ter-
rorist attack is compelling, it is not immediate. A terrorist attack on a
stadium would likely cause a very high number of casualties because
of the high concentration of spectators in an enclosed space. Further,
such an attack would have an enormous effect on the American
psyche, because sports constitute such a big part of American culture.
Yet the likelihood of a terrorist attack on a stadium is relatively small
based on recent trends, including only three attacks on sporting arenas
in the last thirty-five years. Further, authorities have viewed recent
warnings concerning threats against stadiums with skepticism, indicat-
ing that such threats, while substantial, are not concrete.
Pat-downs at entrances to NFL stadiums are significant intrusions
upon reasonable expectations of privacy. Individuals entering NFL
stadiums do not have a diminished expectation of privacy in their per-
sons. While they may expose their body and outer garments to visual
271. Goss et al., supra note 219, at 15.
272. McCann, supra note 139, at 604.
273. Goss et al., supra note 219, at 15.
274. Oussama Damaj, The Problem of Responding to Terrorism, in TERRORISM AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 147, 152 (2002).
275. ASIS Int'l, Anti-Terror Security Measures, http://www.asisonline.org/newsroom/crisisRe-
sponse/antiterrorMeasures.xml (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
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observation by others, they do not expose their body and outer gar-
ments to physical examination by others. As precedent suggests, a
pat-down is a highly invasive intrusion upon this reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. Further, pat-downs subject the persons being
searched to great humiliation, possible sexual harassment and abuse,
or recollections of past harassment and abuse.
Finally, pat-downs instituted at entrances to NFL stadiums are inef-
fective in advancing the governmental interest, because they fail to
reduce or eliminate the threat of a terrorist attack. Because security
personnel at NFL stadiums are faced with the pressure of quickly
moving spectators, they perform very brief pat-downs, which are un-
likely to allow them to detect any small bulges or wires. Additionally,
because the personnel performing these pat-downs do not have anti-
terrorist training, they are unlikely to know what should raise their
suspicion. Further, the pat-downs are easy to deceive, because any
terrorist could adjust the location of her explosive materials based on
her observations of how the pat-downs are performed. Finally, the
pat-downs could actually create a more dangerous situation at the en-
trances to stadiums, because they concentrate a large number of peo-
ple in one an space that is easily accessible to terrorists. Thus, while
the pat-downs create an illusion of protection at stadiums, they are
ineffective at truly protecting patrons.
As the above analysis illustrates, the governmental interest in pro-
tecting NFL patrons from terrorist attacks, while compelling, is not
immediate. Further, the privacy interest at stake and the nature and
degree of intrusion are great. Therefore, the governmental interest
does not outweigh the privacy interest. Unless the government can
establish that there is a specific threat to a specified game at a speci-
fied stadium, courts should not allow suspicionless searches at stadi-
ums. Only in the circumstances described above-where there is a
real and substantial threat of a terrorist attack-does the governmen-
tal interest outweigh the intrusion upon privacy interests caused by
ineffective and invasive pat-downs. The special needs exception re-
quires that the government can articulate a need in concrete terms
and not in vague generalities. If the government is permitted to use
the general fear of a terrorist attack to curtail citizens' constitutional
rights, every large social gathering turns into a display of the govern-
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ment's ability to intrude upon citizens' lives and their fundamental
right to privacy.
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